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Austin: Doe v. McMaster and the Lawyer's Role in Real Estate Transactions

DOE V. MCMASTER AND THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Economic pressure to close real estate loans in a cost-effective manner has
caused both lawyers and lenders to seek ways to minimize the expense of legal
services. Some of these efforts, however, collide with legal and ethical
requirements that mandate a lawyer's involvement in the transactions. South
Carolina courts have made it clear that an attorney must supervise several stages of
the real estate transaction and be present at the closing.' The required extent of the
lawyer's involvement at each stage has, until recently, been less clear. Recent cases
have shed some light on who must have legal counsel and on what is meant by
being "present" at a closing.2 There are still some situations, however, in which it
is not clear whether the court would approve of the transaction.
The issue of unauthorized practice of law in real estate closings is gaining
national prominence. Many jurisdictions have pondered the topic, and most courts
have been less hostile to the idea of nonlawyers conducting real estate closings than
the courts of South Carolina.3 Some states have passed legislation barring
laypersons from conducting real estate closings, although such efforts have drawn
negative attention from federal agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission
4
and the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice.
South Carolina continues to require the presence of an attorney at real estate
closings through statutes, disciplinary rules, and case law. One of the most recent
South Carolina cases dealing with this issue is Doe v. McMaster.' This decision
further elaborated on the role of lawyers and laypersons in real estate transactions,

1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Parts III-IV.
3. See Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 113 S.W.3d 105, 128 (Ky. 2003) (holding that nonlawyers may conduct real estate closings but may not answer legal questions concerning
the closing or provide legal guidance to the parties); Fears v. Va. State Bar, No. LE-1283-3, 2000 WL
249247, at *11 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2000) (acknowledging legislation "authorizing certain qualified

nonlawyers ... to provide escrow, closing and settlement services in transactions involving the
purchase and financing of real estate containing not more than four residential dwelling units"); In re
Opinion 26 of Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654 A.2d 1344, 1361 (N.J. 1995) (holding that
closings may be conducted without separate counsel for each of the parties as long as they are "made
aware of the conflicting interests ofbrokers and title companies in these matters and of the general risks
involved in not being represented by counsel").
4. See generallyJohn Gibeaut, Real Estate Closing Tussle in Tarheel State, 1 A.B.A. J. 7 (Jan.
25, 2002) (discussing the FTC and DOJ's response to two recent bar ethics opinions concerning
lawyers' involvement in real estate closings).
5. 355 S.C. 306, 585 S.E.2d 773 (2003).
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addressing the difference between initial financing transactions and refinancing
transactions, the supervision of the title search process, and the party that the
handling attorney is required to represent.6
In re Lester,7 a case decided since the Doe v. McMaster decision, separately
addressed the requirement of a lawyer's presence at a closing, specifying that it is
not sufficient merely for a lawyer to be available if needed at the closing. This Note
examines the lawyer's role in real estate transactions in light of both decisions. Part
II of this Note considers the statutes, rules, and cases that preceded the Doe v.
McMasteropinion. Part III discusses the issues addressed by the Doe v. McMaster
case. Part IV details the issues raised by In re Lester and future potential
developments.
II. HISTORY
The South Carolina Constitution provides the Supreme Court of South Carolina
with the duty ofregulating the practice of law in South Carolina.8 In 1980, the state
supreme court addressed the unauthorized practice of law in real estate transactions
in In re Easler.9 The court held that a layperson who prepares, executes, and files
a deed for another engages in the unauthorized practice of law unless the final work
product is "subject to the approval of a licensed attorney before recordation or...
the parties to the deed conferred with a licensed attorney concerning the deed."'
Subsequently, in State v. Buyers Service Co., " the court held that a title
company engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when it provided title
information, prepared loan documents, conducted closings, and transferred
documents as part of a real estate transaction without the supervision of an
attorney. 2 The court emphasized the importance of lawyers supervising real estate
and mortgage closings and expressed a deep concern for the protection of
consumers in these transactions. 3
In response to these and other decisions, in 1991 the Unauthorized Practice of
Law Committee of the South Carolina Bar submitted to the Supreme Court of South
Carolina a set of proposed rules governing the unauthorized practice of law. 4 The
proposed rules attempted "to define and delineate the practice of law, and to

6. Id.
7. 353 S.C. 246, 578 S.E.2d 7 (2003).

8. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-10 (West 2001) (recognizing the
"inherent power of the Supreme Court with respect to regulating the practice of law").
9. 275 S.C. 400, 272 S.E.2d 32 (1980).
10. Id. at 402, 272 S.E.2d at 33.
11. 292 S.C. 426, 357 S.E.2d 15 (1987).
12. Id. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320 (West 2001) (strictly prohibiting corporations from
practicing law).
13. 292 S.C. 434, 357 S.E.2d at 19.
14. In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules Proposed by the S.C. Bar, 309 S.C. 304,305,422
S.E.2d 123, 124 (1992).
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establish clear guidelines so that professionals other than attorneys can ensure they
5
do not inadvertently engage in the practice of law."' The supreme court declined
to adopt the rules and stated that what is and what is not the unauthorized practice
6
of law should be decided in the context of individual cases.
On several occasions, the supreme court has publicly reprimanded an attorney
who facilitated the unauthorized practice of law in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 5.5 of South Carolina Appellate Court Rule
7
407, by allowing laypersons to conduct closings without an attorney present.
These decisions provide a backdrop for the issues raised in Doe v. McMaster.
III. DoE v. McMASTER
A.

Background

In Doe v. McMaster, a lawyer, John Doe, petitioned the Supreme Court of
South Carolina in its original jurisdiction to provide a declaratory judgment as to
whether his involvement in certain real estate transactions amounted to assisting a
nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Rule 5.5(b) of South
Carolina Appellate Court Rule 407.I" The court granted the petition and heard the
case as Doe v. Condon on May 16, 2002; it issued a decision on August 5, 2002."
The court then reheard the case as Doe v. McMaster on April 2, 2003 and issued a
new decision, with only minor changes, on August 18, 2003.20
In the typical transaction at issue in Doe v. McMaster, a borrower would
contract with a lender to "refinance an existing first mortgage loan previously
'2
obtained from the same [1]ender." ' The lender would then notify a title insurance
22
provide it with information about the borrower.
and
company about the transaction

15. Id.
16. Id. See also Candy M. Kern-Fuller, Note, Lawyers Beware-This Unauthorized-Practice-ofMay Affect You!, 53 S.C. L. REv. 661 (2002) (discussing the proposed rules and several
Case
Law
unauthorized practice of law cases in the context of a 2000 court decision in which the Supreme Court
of South Carolina held that a paralegal may not conduct legal education seminars for the general public
without an attorney present, that a nonlawyer may not meet privately with clients in a law office and
answer questions without an attorney present, and that a law firm may not share profits with a paralegal
based on the volume and types of cases handled).
17. See In re Edens, 344 S.C. 394,544 S.E.2d 627 (2001) (publicly reprimanding an attorney for
allowing his office manager to conduct refinancing closings in his absence); In re Konohia, 346 S.C.
2, 550 S.E.2d 318 (2001) (suspending an attorney for allowing a paralegal to close real estate
transactions in his absence, among other misconduct); In re Reeve, 335 S.C. 169, 516 S.E.2d 200
(1999) (reprimanding an attorney publicly who collected attorney's fees in connection with three real
estate closings at which he was not present).
18. 355 S.C. 306, 309, 585 S.E.2d 773, 774 (2003).
19. 351 S.C. 158, 568 S.E.2d 356 (2002).
20. McMaster, 355 S.C. at 306, 585 S.E.2d at 773.
21. Id. at 309, 585 S.E.2d at 774.
22. Id.
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The title insurance company would hire an independent contractor to perform a title
search, after which the company would prepare a title commitment for the lender.3
The title company would then order the "pay-off of [the] existing mortgage" and the
"endorsement for [the] [b]orrower's existing homeowners insurance policy, if
requested by [the] [l]ender." '
The lender would "prepar[e] loan documents including a set of instructions, a
note and mortgage, [a] Truth-in-Lending Statement, [a] HUD-1 settlement
statement, [and] miscellaneous affidavits regarding employment" and then give the
documents to Doe." Doe would review the loan documents and title commitment,
make any required changes, and then meet with the borrower "to explain [the] legal
ramifications of [the] loan documents and answer any questions [the] [b]orrower
may have regarding the documents or the refinancing process." 6 Doe would
"supervis[e] [t]he execution of [the] loan documents" and send them to the title
insurance company with "specific instructions regarding how, when and where to
satisfy the existing mortgage and to record the new mortgage."" Doe would also
"authoriz[e] the disbursement of funds if the [b]orrower [did] not rescind" the
transaction. 8
The title company would then satisfy the existing mortgage, transfer the new
mortgage for recording, and pay out funds in accordance with the HUD-1 settlement
statement.29 The lender or the title insurance company would "transmi[t] documents
evidencing the satisfaction of the paid-off mortgage to the Register of Deeds for
recording," and then the title company would "issu[e] [a] final title insurance policy
to the lender."30 Doe would collect a fee for representing the borrower that was
3
consistent with the fee typically charged in a South Carolina refinance transaction. '
B. Discussion

The supreme court concluded that Doe's business association was not the
unauthorized practice of law as long as the association was conducted as prescribed
in the opinion.3' Doe v. McMaster is the Supreme Court of South Carolina's latest
attempt to clarify what is required of an attorney involved in a real estate closing.
In both State v. Buyers Service Co. and Doe v. McMaster,the court discussed the

purchase of residential real estate and the refinancing of residential real estate in
four distinct steps: (1) the title search; (2) the preparation of loan documents; (3)

23. Id. at 309, 585 S.E.2d at 774-75.
24. Id. at 309-10, 585 S.E.2d at 775.
25. Id. at 310, 585 S.E.2d at 775.
26. Doe v. McMaster, 355 S.C. 306, 310, 585 S.E.2d 773, 775 (2003).
27. Id.
28. Id.

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 311, 585 S.E.2d at 775.
32. Doe v. McMaster, 355 S.C. 306, 316, 585 S.E.2d 773, 778 (2003).
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33
the closing; and (4) the recording of the title and mortgage.
At first, Doe tried to distinguish his case from Buyers Service on the ground
that his case involved refinancing an existing mortgage, while Buyers Service
34
involved the purchase of new property. The court rejected this argument and
emphasized that the standards are the same for the refinancing and purchasing of
property.3 5
title company "has a right
With respect to the title search, Doe argued that the
36 However, in accordance
business."
to furnish title because it is incidental to its
with Buyers Service, the court held that "because the 'examination of titles requires
expert legal knowledge and skill,"' the search must be conducted under the
supervision of a licensed attorney."
Although in Doe's scenario he would serve in some supervisory capacity by
looking over the title commitment, the court made it clear that an attorney looking
over the title commitment is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of attorney
38
supervision of this process. However, it is doubtful that the court meant to require
a lawyer to go down to the courthouse and supervise the title search process.
the attorney reviews
Rather, the requirements of Doe would appear to be satisfied if 39
the title abstract to ensure the accuracy of the title commitment. The reasoning for
this requirement was best explained in the Buyers Service decision, in which the
court stated that although a "buyer does not see the title abstract,4 he nevertheless
relies upon it to determine if he receives good, marketable title."
The court identified the preparation of loan documents as the second phase of
the real estate transaction. After Buyers Service, it was clear that a third-party
nonlawyer could not prepare documents on behalf of the parties to a real estate
transaction.4" Doe argued, however, that the lender has a right to prepare its own
42
loan documents when it is a party. The court disagreed, stating that corporations
43
do not have the same rights as individuals to appear pro se in all instances. The
court relied on both a statute which forbids corporations to practice law on behalf
of others and a case which explicitly rejects a corporation's ability to appearpro se

357 S.E.2d
33. Id. at 312, 585 S.E.2d at 776; State v. Buyers Serv. Co., 292 S.C. 426,430-34,
15, 17-19(1987).
34. McMaster, 355 S.C. at 312, 585 S.E.2d at 776.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 312, 585 S.E.2d at 776.
at 18).
37. Id. at 313, 585 S.E.2d at 776 (quoting Buyers Serv., 292 S.C. at 432, 357 S.E.2d
38. Id.
(holding that
39. See also Exparte Watson, No. 25757, 2003 WL 22843587 (S.C. Dec. 1,2003)
legal sufficiency by
if a licensed attorney reviews the title abstractor's report and vouches for its
of law).
signing the report, the title abstractor will not be engaged in the unauthorized practice
40. Buyers Serv., 292 S.C. at 432, 357 S.E.2d at 18.
41. Id. at 431, 357 S.E.2d at 18.
42. McMaster, 355 S.C. at 313, 585 S.E.2d at 776.
43. Id. at 313, 585 S.E.2d at 776-77.
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in a state circuit or appellate court, 44 and applied this restriction on a corporation's
ability to litigate on its own behalf to document preparation in a transactional
setting.45
This principle, if logically extended beyond loan documentation, could have
significant ramifications on commercial transactions. The court has never
previously suggested that it would prohibit companies from drafting their own
documents, including documents governing relationships with others, such as
employee handbooks and other business contracts. Although it is unlikely that the
court intended Doe to have such a far-reaching effect, it is now less clear when a
business may draft its own documents for use in dealing with customers.
Although the court in part couched its limitation on the drafting of loan
documents in terms of a bar on the lender actingpro se, it also wrote of the need for
"independent" counsel.46 The court did not define the term "independent," but the
context of the opinion suggests the court was particularly concerned with the
potential harm to an unrepresented borrower dealing with a well-counseled lender.
The real concern may not have been the issue of whether the lender could act pro
se but with whether the borrower should have legal counsel.
Although the court rejected Doe's pro se argument, it differentiated between
Doe v. McMaster and Buyers Service on the grounds that Doe would review all of
the documents and correct them, if needed, to ensure their compliance with the
law.47 In the proposed scenario, Doe would provide adequate supervision by an
attorney, and there would be no unauthorized practice of law in regard to the
preparation of loan documents.48
When dealing with the closing aspect of the transaction, the court differentiated
Doe's case from Buyers Service because an attorney was "actively involved in the
closing" and was available to answer any questions from the buyer.49 Again, the
court emphasized that the attorney involved in the closing must be an "independent"
attorney, apparently meaning a lawyer unassociated with the lender to protect the
adverse interests of each party. The rationale behind this limitation is that "'adverse
interests in real estate transactions make it extremely difficult for the attorney to
maintain a proper professional posture toward each party."' 50 In order to prevent
overreaching by the lender, an attorney representing the borrower must be present.
The court concluded that Doe met these standards because he was not an employee
of the title company; rather, he would be chosen from a list of attorneys provided

44. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Renaissance Enters, Inc. v.
Summit Teleservices, Inc., 334 S.C. 649, 515 S.E.2d 257 (1999)).
45. Id. at 314, 585 S.E.2d at 777.
46. Id. at 314-15, 585 S.E.2d at 777.
47. Id. at 314, 585 S.E.2d at 777.
48. Doe v. McMaster, 355 S.C. 306, 314, 585 S.E.2d 773, 777 (2003).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 315, 585 S.E.2d at 777 (quoting State v. Buyers Serv. Co., 292 S.C. 426,431-32, 357
S.E.2d 15, 18 (1987)).
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by the lender to the borrower." However, Doe must give "full disclosure of his role
52
to both parties and obtain[] consent" to participate in the closing.
Finally, the court stated that Doe's instructions, written on the loan documents
that he would forward to the title company, would constitute sufficient attorney
53
supervision over the recordation process. The court therefore held that under the
circumstances outlined in the opinion, Doe's business association would not
5
constitute the unauthorized practice of law. '
IV. THE DEFINITION OF "PRESENCE"

AND THE FUTURE OF REAL ESTATE

TRANSACTIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

The court in Doe v. McMaster affimned other previous decisions by requiring
that an attorney be present at the closing to conduct the transaction and "answer[]
55
any questions the buyer may have." However, Doe v. McMaster went a step
further by indicating that the attorney present must be the borrower's
representative. 56 In the 2003 In re Lester decision, the court elucidated this
"presence" requirement by finding it insufficient for a layperson to conduct the
closing while the handling attorney was merely accessible by telephone or while
57
The court held that either "[the
other attorneys were available in the office.
physically present to
respondent] or another licensed attorney should have been
5
closings."
and
transactions
conduct the actual real estate
One practice not specifically addressed by the court thus far is the extent to
which a lawyer may advise a client or supervise a closing by electronic means.
Modem technology allows lawyers to be electronically present for depositions or
court hearings. When the lawyer is "virtually" present at a closing, with the ability
for the lawyer and client to communicate in real time, the borrower would still be
free to ask any questions related to the transaction. The concern for the borrower's
protection from overreaching by the lender would be nonexistent, as the borrower
would still be represented by an independent attorney.
Nevertheless, doubt remains as to the legal viability of this option, given the
court's specific mandate that a lawyer be "physically present" at closing. A literal
reading of the physical presence requirement as precluding virtual presence may

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 315, 585 S.E.2d at 778.
Id. at 316, 585 S.E.2d at 778.
Doe v. McMaster, 355 S.C. 306, 316, 585 S.E.2d 773, 778 (2003).

55. Id. at 314, 585 S.E.2d 777.

56. Id. at 315, 585 S.E.2d at 777 ("[A]dverse interests in real estate transactions make it
extremely difficult for the attorney to maintain a proper professional posture toward each party.").
57. In re Lester, 353 S.C. 246, 247, 578 S.E.2d 7, 7 (2003).
58. Id. (emphasis added) See also In re Pstrak 357 S.C. 1,4,591 S.E.2d 623,625 (2004) (holding
attorneys may supervise different parts of the real estate transaction but each has a
different
that
responsibility to see that another attorney has been involved in all other aspects of the transaction

requiring attorney participation).
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have a significant impact upon South Carolina real estate transactions involving outof-state buyers or sellers. For example,an out-of-state buyer who wants to purchase
or refinance property (such as a summer home) in South Carolina may retain a
member of the South Carolina Bar to handle the transaction. A literal reading of
Lester would suggest that either the purchaser must come to the state to be present
with the lawyer at the closing or the attorney must go to the purchaser's location to
conduct the closing. If the lawyer must be physically present when all the parties
are within the state, should it matter that a client lives, instead, in New York? It is
a question that remains unanswered for now.
The Professional Responsibility Committee of the South Carolina Bar has
drafted a new rule in response to confusion among the bar as to the obligations of
attorneys in these situations. A draft proposed on August 29, 2003 states that "[n]ot
withstanding any other provision of these Rules, when any client is physically
present at a real estate closing, an attorney responsible for the closing shall also be
physically present with that client throughout the closing."59 Comments appended
to the proposed rule state that presence through video conference or teleconference
is sufficient and if the client is unable to be present at the closing, the attorney may
explain the documents in writing and obtain the client's informed consent in writing
prior to the closing.6" The latter proposal, however, has not been formally submitted
to the supreme court.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of South Carolina has made it clear that the unauthorized
practice of law in the context of real estate closings is an issue that is not taken
lightly. Under current law, an independent attorney must properly supervise all of
the steps of the transaction and be physically present at the closing. Differing
opinions still exist as to the intended meaning of physical presence. Further rule
additions and supreme court decisions may be necessary to clarify this complex and
evolving area of the law in South Carolina.
Tara Austin

59. S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 1.19 (drafted Aug. 29, 2003).
60. Id.
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